Sec. XII. And generally speaking of all existing things, as they themselves admit and is clear, some are governed by nature, some by habit, some by an unreasoning soul, some by a soul that has reason and intelligence. Man too participates in all this, and is subject to all those differences here mentioned, for he is affected by habit, and nourished by nature, and uses reason and intelligence. He has also a share of the unreasoning element, and has the principle of passion innate in him, not as a mere episode in his life but as a necessity, which ought not therefore to be entirely rooted out, but requires care and attention. For the function of reason is no Thracian or Lycurgean one to root up and destroy all the good elements in passion indiscriminately with the bad, but, as some genial and mild god, to prune what is wild, and to correct disproportion, and after that to train and cultivate the useful part. For as those who are afraid to get drunk do not pour on the ground their wine, _but mix it with water_, so those who are afraid of the disturbing element in passion do not eradicate passion altogether but temper it. Similarly with oxen and horses people try to restrain their mad bounds and restiveness, not their movements and powers of work, and so reason makes use of the passions when they have become tame and docile, not by cutting out the sinews or altogether mutilating the serviceable part of the soul. For as Pindar says, "The horse to the chariot, and the ox to the plough, while he that meditates destruction for the boar must find a staunch hound."[243] But much more useful than these are the whole tribe of passions when they wait on reason and run parallel to virtue. Thus moderate anger is useful to courage, and hatred of evil to uprightness, and righteous indignation against those who are fortunate beyond their deserts, when they are inflamed in their souls with folly and insolence and need a check. And no one if they wished could pluck away or sever[244] natural affection from friendship, or pity from philanthropy, or sympathy both in joy and grief from genuine goodwill. And if those err who wish to banish love because of erotic madness, neither are they right who blame all desire because of love of money, but they act like people who refuse to run because they might stumble, or to throw because they might throw wide of the mark, or object to sing altogether because they might make a false note. For as in sounds music does not create melody by the banishment of sharps and flats, and as in bodies the art of the physician procures health not by the doing away of cold and heat but by their being blended in due proportions and quantities, so is victory won in the soul by the powers and motions of the passions being reduced by reason to moderation and due proportion. For excessive grief or fear or joy in the soul (I speak not of mere joy grief or fear), resembles a body swollen or inflamed. And Homer when he says excellently,
"The brave man's colour never changes, nor Is he much frightened,"[245]
does not take away all fear but only excessive fear, that bravery may not become recklessness, nor confidence foolhardiness. So also in regard to pleasure we must do away with excessive desire, and in regard to vengeance with excessive hatred of evil. For so in the former case one will not be apathetic but temperate, and in the latter one will not be savage or cruel but just. But if the passions were entirely removed, supposing that to be possible, reason would become in many duller and blunter, like the pilot in the absence of a storm. And no doubt it is from having noticed this that legislators try to excite in states ambition and emulation among their townsmen, and stir up and increase their courage and pugnacity against enemies by the sound of trumpets and flutes. For it is not only in poems, as Plato says, that he that is inspired by the Muses, and as it were possessed by them, will laugh to shame the plodding artist, but also in fighting battles passion and enthusiasm will be irresistible and invincible, such as Homer makes the gods inspire men with, as in the line,
"Thus speaking he infused great might in Hector, The shepherd of the people."[246]
and,
"He is not mad like this without the god,"[247]
as if the god had added passion to reason as an incitement and spur. And you may see those very persons, whose opinions I am combating, frequently urging on the young by praises, and frequently checking them by rebukes, though pleasure follows the one, pain the other. For rebukes and censure produce repentance and shame, the one bringing grief, the other fear, and these they mostly make use of for purposes of correction. And so Diogenes, when Plato was being praised, said, "What has he to vaunt of, who has been a philosopher so long, and yet never gave pain to anyone?" For one could not say, to use the words of Xenocrates, that the mathematics are such handles to philosophy as are the emotions of young men, such as shame, desire, repentance, pleasure, pain, ambition, whereon reason and the law laying a suitable grip succeed in putting the young man on the right road. So that it was no bad remark of the Lacedaemonian tutor, that he would make the boy entrusted to his charge pleased with what was good and displeased with what was bad,[248] for a higher or nobler aim cannot be proposed in the education fit for a freeborn lad.
[219] See "Meno," p. 72, A.
[220] Omitting [Greek: hetera], which Reiske justly suspects.
[221] Reading [Greek: proton] with Wyttenbach.
[222] Homer, "Odyssey," xix. 208-212.
[223] As in the story in "Gil Blas" of the person who, after eating a ragout of rabbit, was told it was a ragout of cat.--Book X. chapter xii.
[224] As to Amoebeus, see Athenaeus, p. 623. D.
[225] "Iliad," xvi. 167.
[226] Generally speaking [Greek: ethos] is the habit, [Greek: ethos] the moral character generated by habit. The former is Aristotle's [Greek: energeia], the latter his [Greek: hexis].
[227] I have adopted, it will be seen, the suggestion of Wyttenbach, "[Greek: to logismo] mutandum videtur in [Greek: ton chalinon]."
[228] Sophocles, "Oedipus Tyrannus," 4, 5. Quoted by our author again "On Abundance of Friends," Sec. vi.
[229] Reading with "Reiske," [Greek: exagetai pros to epithymein ta aischra].
[230] In the "Chrysippus" of Euripides, Fragm.
[231] Compare Romans viii. 19.
[232] "Odyssey," xii. 168, 169.
[233] This line is from Simonides, and is quoted again in "How one may be aware of one's Progress in Virtue," Sec. xiv.
[234] "Iliad," vii. 93.
[235] Reading with Reiske, [Greek: eis duo].
[236] Reading [Greek: etei] with Reiske and Wyttenbach.
[237] Euripides, "Hippolytus" 385, 386.
[238] Reading with Reiske [Greek: pathesi] for [Greek: pleiosi].
[239] See "Iliad," x. 374, sq.
[240] "Iliad," xi. 547.
[241] "De Anaxarchi supplicio nota res. v. Menage ad Diog. Laeert. 9, 59. De Magae, reguli Cyrenarum, adversus Philemonem lenitate v. De Cohibenda Ira, Sec. ix."--_Reiske._
[242] "Celebres fuere quondam Chrysippi sex libri [Greek: peri tes kata tas lezeis anomalias], in quibus auctore Varrone, _propositum habuit ostendere, similes res dissimilibus verbis et similibus dissimiles esse notatas vocabulis_. v. Menage ad Diog. Laeert. 7, 192."--_Reiske._
[243] Compare "On Contentedness of Mind," Sec. xiii.
[244] Reading with _Reiske_, [Greek: aporrezeien].
[245] "Iliad," xiii. 284, 285.
[246] "Iliad," xv. 262.
[247] "Iliad," v. 185.
[248] Compare "That Virtue may be Taught," Sec. ii.
HOW ONE MAY BE AWARE OF ONE'S PROGRESS IN VIRTUE.
Sec. I. What amount of argument, Sossius Senecio, will make a man know that he is improving in respect to virtue, if his advances in it do not bring about some diminution in folly, but vice, weighing equally with all his good intentions, "acts like the lead that makes the net go down?"[249] For neither in music nor grammatical knowledge could anyone recognize any improvement, if he remained as unskilful in them as before, and had not lost some of his old ignorance. Nor in the case of anyone ill would medical treatment, if it brought no relief or ease, by the disease somewhat yielding and abating, give any perception of improvement of health, till the opposite condition was completely brought about by the body recovering its full strength. But just as in these cases there is no improvement unless, by the abatement of what weighs them down till they rise in the opposite scale, they recognize a change, so in the case of those who profess philosophy no improvement or sign of improvement can be supposed, unless the soul lay aside and purge itself of some of its imperfection, and if it continue altogether bad until it become absolutely good and perfect. For indeed a wise man cannot in a moment of time change from absolute badness to perfect goodness, and suddenly abandon for ever all that vice, of which he could not during a long period of time divest himself of any portion. And yet you know, of course, that those who maintain these views frequently give themselves much trouble and bewilderment about the difficulty, that a wise man does not perceive that he has become wise, but is ignorant and doubtful that in a long period of time by little and little, by removing some things and adding others, there will be a secret and quiet improvement, and as it were passage to virtue. But if the change were so great and sudden that the worst man in the morning could become the best man at night, or should the change so happen that he went to bed vicious and woke up in the morning wise, and, having dismissed from his mind all yesterday's follies and errors, should say,