LXV. A Senate being formed, upon the proposition of Cato they came to a resolution to put no Roman to death except in battle, and not to plunder any city that was subject to the Romans, which increased still further the popularity of the party of Pompeius; for those who were unconcerned about the war by reason of being far removed from it or who were disregarded on account of their weakness, gave Pompeius the benefit of their good wishes at least, and as far as words could go contended on his behalf in favour of the right, considering every man an enemy to gods and to men who did not wish Pompeius to be victorious. Cæsar also showed much moderation in his success, for after he had captured and defeated the forces of Pompeius in Iberia,[358] he let the generals go and employed the troops. After crossing the Alps again and hurrying through Italy, he arrived at Brundisium about the winter solstice. He then crossed the sea and putting in at Oricum sent Jubius,[359] a friend of Pompeius, who was his prisoner, to Pompeius[360] to propose that they should both meet together on the third day, disband all their forces, and after being reconciled and confirming their union by oath, return to Italy. Pompeius again considered this to be an ambuscade, and hastily going down to the sea he took possession of the posts and places which presented very strong positions for an army; he also seized the naval stations and landing places which were favourable for those who came by sea, so that every wind which blew brought to Pompeius corn or troops or money; but Cæsar being confined in straits both on the sea and land side was of necessity glad to fight, and he attacked the lines of Pompeius and continually provoked him to battle, in which Cæsar had generally the advantage and the superiority in the skirmishing. But on one occasion he narrowly escaped being completely crushed and losing his army, for Pompeius fought with great courage and routed all the enemy, who lost two thousand men; but he was either unable or was afraid to force his way into Cæsar's camp and to enter with the fugitives, which made Cæsar say to his friends, "To-day the victory would have been with the enemy, if they had had a commander who knew how to conquer."
LXVI. The partisans of Pompeius being greatly elated at this success were eager to have a decisive battle. Pompeius wrote to the distant kings and generals and cities to inform them that he was victorious, but he feared the risk of a battle, thinking that by delay and reducing the enemy to straits he should finally vanquish men who were invincible in arms and had long been accustomed to conquer together, but as to the other military duties, and marches, and change of position, and digging of trenches and building of walls, were not efficient by reason of age and on this account were eager to come to close fighting and to engage hand to hand. However, previous to the last contest Pompeius had been able in some degree to draw his men from their purpose by persuading them to keep quiet; but when Cæsar after the battle was compelled by want of provisions to break up his camp, and began his march into Thessaly through the country of the Athamanes,[361] the confidence of the soldiers of Pompeius could no longer be kept in check, and calling out that Cæsar was flying, some were for following and pursuing him, and others for crossing over into Italy, and others were sending to Rome their slaves and friends to get possession of houses near the Forum, with the intention of forthwith becoming candidates for office. Many of their own accord sailed to Cornelia who was in Lesbos bearing the good tidings of the war being at an end; for Pompeius had sent her there out of the way of danger. The Senate being assembled, Afranius gave his opinion that they should stick to Italy, for Italy was the chief prize of the war, and would bring to those who were masters of it the possession of Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Iberia, and all Gaul; and as to that which was the greatest concern to Pompeius, his native country who was stretching out her hands only at a short distance from them, it was not honourable to leave her to be insulted and enslaved by slaves and flatterers of tyrants. But Pompeius did not consider it to be consistent with his reputation to run away from Cæsar a second time and to be pursued, when fortune gave him the opportunity of being the pursuer, nor did he think it consistent with his duty to desert Scipio[362] and the consular men in Hellas and Thessaly who would immediately fall into Cæsar's hands with their military chests and large forces; he thought also that Rome was best cared for by fighting in her defence as far from her as possible, that she might wait for the conqueror without feeling or hearing of any misfortunes.
LXVII. Having come to this decision, Pompeius pursued Cæsar, resolved to avoid a battle, but by following close up to hem him in and wear him out by privation. He had other reasons for thinking this to be the best plan, and it also reached his ears that it was a subject of common conversation among the cavalry that they ought to defeat Cæsar as soon as they could and then put down Pompeius also. Some say that this was also the reason why Pompeius employed Cato[363] in no matter of importance, but even when he was marching against Cæsar left him on the coast to look after the stores, through fear that if Cæsar were destroyed, Cato might forthwith compel him also to lay down his command. Accordingly as he followed the enemy leisurely he was much censured and there was a clamour against him, that his object was not to defeat Cæsar by his generalship, but his native country and the Senate, that he might always keep the command and never give over having as his attendants and guards those who considered themselves the masters of the world. Domitius Ahenobarbus also by always calling him Agamemnon and King of Kings made him odious. Favonius too made himself no less disagreeable by his scoffing manner than others by the unseasonable freedom of their language, calling out, "Men, we shall not eat figs in Tusculum[364] even this year!" Lucius Afranius who had lost his forces in Iberia and on that account had fallen under the imputation of treachery, now seeing that Pompeius avoided a battle, said he was surprised that those who accused him did not advance and fight against the trafficker in provinces. By these and like expressions often repeated they at last prevailed over Pompeius, a man who was a slave to public fame and the opinion of his friends, and drew him on to follow their own hopes and impetuosity and to give up the best considered plans, a thing which would have been unbefitting even in the master of a vessel, to say nothing of the commander-in-chief of so many nations and forces. Pompeius approved of the physician who never gratifies the desires of his patients, and yet he yielded to military advisers who were in a diseased state, through fear of offending if he adopted healing measures. And how can one say those men were in a healthy state, some of whom were going about among the troops and already canvassing for consulships and prætorships, and Spinther and Domitius[365] and Scipio were disputing and quarrelling about the priesthood of Cæsar and canvassing, just as if Tigranes the Armenian were encamped by them or the King of the Nabathæans, and not that Cæsar and that force with which he had taken a thousand cities by storm, and subdued above three hundred nations, and had fought with Germans and Gauls unvanquished in more battles than could be counted, and had taken a hundred times ten thousand prisoners, and had slaughtered as many after routing them in pitched battles.
LXVIII. However, by importunity and agitation, after the army had descended into the plain of Pharsalus,[366] they compelled Pompeius to hold a council of war, in which Labienus, who was commander of the cavalry, got up first, and swore that he would not leave the battle till he had routed the enemy; and they all swore to the same effect. In the night Pompeius dreamed that as he was entering the theatre, the people clapped, and that he was decorating a temple of Venus the Victorious[367] with many spoils. And in some respects he was encouraged, but in others rather depressed by the dream, lest fame and glory should accrue from him to the race of Cæsar, which traced its descent from Venus; and certain panic alarms which were rushing through the camp aroused him. In the morning-watch a bright light[368] shone forth above the camp of Cæsar, which was in a state of profound tranquillity, and a flame-like torch springing from this light descended upon the camp of Pompeius; and Cæsar himself says that he witnessed this as he was visiting the watches. At daybreak, as Cæsar was going to move to Scotussa,[369] and the soldiers were engaged in taking down the tents and sending forward the beasts and camp-followers, the scouts came with intelligence that they spied many arms in the enemy's encampment moving backwards and forwards, and that there was a movement and noise as of men coming out to battle. After them others came announcing that the vanguard was already putting itself in battle order. Upon this, Cæsar observing that the expected day had arrived on which they would have to fight against men, and not against hunger and poverty, quickly gave orders to hang out in front of his tent the purple colours,[370] which is the signal for battle among the Romans. The soldiers at the sight of it left their tents with loud shouts and rejoicing and hurried to arms; as the centurions led them to their several ranks, every man, just as if he belonged to a chorus, without confusion, being well trained, quietly took his place.